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primarily on its relation to other concepts of interest. For example, there was a
debate in the mid-Twentieth century about the relation of prediction to explana-
tion, and whether it was symmetrical, as the deductive-nomological model of
explanation implies (Canfield & Lehrer, 1961; Hanna, 1969; Hempel & Oppenheim,
1948; Kim, 1964; Rescher, 1958; Rescher, 1963; Scheffler, 1957; Suchting, 1967).
There is a live contemporary debate on the significance of predictive success for
scientific realism (Barnes, 2008; Barnes, 2014; Carrier, 2014; Menke, 2014; Laudan,
1981; Lawson, 1985; Lipton, 2004, 2005; Mayo, 2014; Schindler, 2014; Schurz, 2014;
Van Fraassen, 1980; Votsis, 2014; Worrall, 2014). Nicholas Rescher has offered a
book-length treatment of prediction, and one of the present authors has published
discussions and a theory of prediction (Broadbent, 2011, 2013, pp. 81e114). These
exceptions notwithstanding, it is fair to say that the topic has not attracted sus-
tained attention in its own right in the philosophical literature.Here’s a prediction: if Sam doesn’t smoke, Sam probably won’t
have a stroke.Here’s a similar sounding claim: if Samdoes smoke, Sam
probably still won’t have a stroke. Finally: smoking will cause strokes
ina largepopulationof individuals similar toSam(and includingSam).
Each of these scientific predictions might be inferred from different
components of the same body of epidemiological and experimental
evidence. The first prediction might be inferred from the low rate of
strokes in a non-smoking population; the second prediction from the
low (but higher) rate of strokes in a smoking population; the last from
the ensemble of research evidence supporting the association be-
tween smoking and strokes. All three inferences will likely consider
other information about the study populations and the Sam-like
population, including similarities and dissimilarities.
In order to understand the last prediction, the prediction that
smoking will cause strokes in a Sam-like population, we cannot rely
onlyon thevast causal inference literature in thephilosophyof science.
Studying causal inference might help us understand why the epide-
miologists concluded from certain research data (including an asso-
ciation between smoking and strokes) that smoking causes strokes,
and alsowhether theywere justified in their conclusion. But it cannot
help us assess thepredictive inference(s) that led to the conclusion that
smoking will cause strokes in a Sam-like population. The predictive
inference could not have involved studying an association between
smoking and strokes in the Sam-like population because the cases of
stroke we predict in the Sam-like population have not yet occurred.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.07.001
1369-8486/ 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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Biomedical Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.07.001Nor can we understand any of the three prediction claims
simply by labelling them as explananda, considering the epidemi-
ologic evidence as an explanans, and straightforwardly applying
our favourite account of explanation from the philosophy of sci-
ence. The fact that most smokers in the study did not have a stroke
does not explain why Sam will not have a stroke, even though it
might help us to predict that Sam will not have one. There is much
more to understanding prediction than that.
Compared to topics like causal inference and explanation, pre-
diction has received scarce attention in the philosophy of science
(Douglas, 2009).1 Yet it is a central activity in many scientificgy and medicine, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
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implemented. In public policy, we wish to knowwhich policies will
work and how effective they will be, and the social sciences often
provide the research needed to answer these important questions.
Likewise, in medicine and in public health we must decide which
dangerous exposures to avoid and which beneficial treatments to
use; in this case the health sciences, including epidemiology, supply
the data along with some of the inferential machinery.
Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determinants
of disease and other health states in human populations by means
of group comparisons for the purpose of improving population
health (Broadbent, 2013, p. 1). This definition does not make
obvious the distinctive features of epidemiology, which also make
it philosophically interesting. Epidemiology is a detective-like sci-
ence, approaching its topic piecemeal and in a pragmatic fashion-
dquite unlike economics, which onemight imagine to be similar in
character. Unlike economics, epidemiology does not formulate
laws; it does not even formulate theories in the sense in which
philosophers use the word. Rather than seeking a comprehensive
and unified description of its domain, it is focused on particular
problems (e.g. does living next to electricity lines increase the
incidence of some kinds of cancer?). This makes it hard to apply the
terms of many traditional philosophical debates to epidemiology.
The most pressing concerns in the philosophy of epidemiology
concern causation, explanation, anddimportantlydprediction. Ep-
idemiologists often rely on ‘observational’ studies, meaning non-
experimental studies (the investigator does not conduct an experi-
ment, but rather ‘observes’ a large number of people, and makes
inferences on the basis of these passive observations). The inability
to intervene in many contexts involving human subjects raises
conceptual questions about the meaningfulness and predictive
usefulness of estimates that are arrived at on the basis of observa-
tional studies. Because the population in an observational study is a
group of diverse people in diverse circumstances, questions can arise
as to whetherdfor exampledit is meaningful to estimate the excess
mortality attributable to obesity. In particular, it is not clear that such
an estimate allows us to predict the effect of reducing obesity in a
population, since the variousways inwhichwemight reduce obesity
(exercise, diet, smoking, amphetamines) may produce different
outcomes (Hernán & Taubman, 2008). Furthermore, epidemiology
runs into philosophical difficulties concerning the role of causal
knowledge in the classification of diseases. Many of the diseases of
contemporary interest appear to be ‘multifactorial’, meaning thatwe
cannot define them in relation to a specific cause or set of causes
(Broadbent, 2009, 2013, p.1453). This raises a question as towhether
toomuch is claimed or hoped for sound causal inference. Identifying
a risk factordpart of the multifactorial constellation of causesdand
establishing that it is causal turns out not to be as useful for public
health or clinical intervention as one might imagine. This calls for
conceptual andmethodological work on topics downstream of causal
inference, such as how to use causal knowledge to predict.
We should pause for a moment to distinguish epidemiology
from ‘clinical epidemiology’ and evidence-based medicine (EBM).
While epidemiology is mainly oriented towards population and
public health, clinical epidemiology is mainly interested in the
health of individual patients as a science for clinical medicine
(Bluhm & Borgerson, 2011). Meanwhile, EBM is the application of
clinical research evidence to the care of patients. Although all three
disciplines are reliant on a common set of research methods
(population studies), clinical epidemiology and evidence-based
medicine represent a different intellectual tradition compared to
epidemiology. For instance, while epidemiology is especially reliant
on observational studies, clinical epidemiology and EBM often
emphasize experimental human studies, particularly randomized
clinical trials.Please cite this article in press as: Fuller, J., et al., Prediction in epidemiolo
Biomedical Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.07.001EBM and clinical medicine raise their own interesting philo-
sophical problems, which are explored in the philosophy of medi-
cine. By developing explicit standards to guide diagnostic,
prognostic and therapeutic inferences, EBM has prompted an
increasing number of philosophical incursions into the largely
unexplored terrain of clinical prediction. EBM’s hierarchies of evi-
dencedessentially hierarchies of evidence for clinical pre-
dictionsdhave fuelled philosophical discussion about the relative
soundness of prediction activities based on qualitatively different
kinds of medical evidence (Clarke, Gillies, Illari, Russo, &
Williamson, 2014; Howick, 2011; Worrall, 2002). Philosophers
have drawn attention to the need to study medical prediction ac-
tivities in more detail, revealing that they often involve unexam-
ined steps (Cartwright, 2012; Fuller & Flores, 2015). One of these
activities is the extrapolation of results from medical research
studies to a population or patient of interest. The problem of
extrapolation or external validity is a general problem, but an
especially venerable one in medicine. The benefits of philosophical
attention to these problems are bidirectional. Philosophers can
bring clarity and insight to genuine problems in medical research
and practice, while examining philosophical problems that are of
interest to philosophy of science.
In particular, the topic of scientific prediction throws new light
on well-studied philosophical problems like induction and expla-
nation, but raises novel questions as well. What is a prediction?
What makes a good prediction activity; should we evaluate pre-
diction activities according to how reliable they are, or how well
justified they are? Canwe identify a set of exclusive and exhaustive
types of scientific prediction, such as ‘statistical prediction’ and
‘theoretical prediction’? Are the types of prediction used in scien-
tific practice discipline-specific or discipline-nonspecific?
In epidemiology, how can we derive predictions about future
distributions of disease or the results of an intervention in a
population? Should we be guided by standard methods and
inference schemes, or by more general epistemic principles (and
what might these methods, schemes or principles be)? In clinical
medicine, how can we make predictions about individual patients
from population data? What sort of evidence might various
sources of knowledge, including knowledge of biological mecha-
nisms and knowledge from population research, provide for
medical prediction? Are some kinds of evidence stronger than
others? And how might we evaluate the strength of particular
kinds of evidence?
The papers in this special section illustrate the philosophical
novelty and practical importance of examining prediction in
epidemiology and medicine, and of increased philosophical atten-
tion to epidemiology and medicine in general. Jonathan Fuller
and Luis Flores (2015) represent the Risk Generalization-
Particularization (Risk GP) Model, which they argue is the stan-
dard model of prediction in contemporary medicine. The model
involves generalizing or extrapolating the risk of the outcome or
the effect size from a population study, and subsequently trans-
forming (a) the risk or (b) the effect size into (a) the probability or
(b) the change in probability of an outcome for a particular patient.
Fuller and Flores discuss several well-known problems in the
context of their model, including the problem of extrapolation and
the reference class problem. One might wonder whether the au-
thors have oversimplified medical prediction by describing a
univocal standard. The authors themselves discuss many other
models of prediction that are sometimes used in practice, including
mechanistic reasoning and induction from personal clinical expe-
rience. Though the authors present these other models as alter-
natives, it may be worthwhile to ask how various methods of
medical prediction could be complementary or might provide
mutual confirmation for a single prediction claim.gy and medicine, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
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effectiveness of medical interventions, building on another paper in
this issue of the journal (2015b) in which he is concerned with
conceptual issues related tomedical effectiveness. In his conceptual
paper (2015b), Stegenga argues that an effective medical inter-
vention must treat disease (versus, for instance, a non-disease
bodily state or a social ill) or else it is not a medical intervention.
He argues for a hybridist account of disease, which includes both a
constitutive causal (natural) component and a harmful (normative)
component. He further argues that an effective medical interven-
tion is an intervention that (successfully) targets either the causal
basis of disease or the normative basis of disease. Stegenga also
places a little-discussed necessary condition on effectiveness: an
effective medical condition must improve health. As the notion of
health is just as controversial as the notion of disease, his account
leaves an important question unanswered: what does it mean for
an effective medical intervention to improve health?
In his measurement paper (2015a), Stegenga discusses three
epistemic challenges in measuring effectiveness: the choice of
measuring instrument (e.g. a subjective symptom rating scale), the
choice of outcome measure (measure of association), and the
problem of extrapolation from the study to a target population. His
paper illustrates that predicting effectiveness in a target population
requires addressing prior problems that are not so straightforward.
Stegenga argues that contemporary research fails to adequately
address these challenges, which contributes to an overestimation
of the effectiveness of our medical interventions. Hemakes a strong
case for the existence of a sort of generalised bias towards over-
estimating predicted effectiveness. Perhaps the main question the
paper leaves unanswered concerns the origin of this generalised
bias. Is it driven solely by extrinsic factorsdsuch as financial in-
terest? Or is there a problem more intrinsic to scientific methods
and inferences in this domain that tends to make predictions over-
estimate effectiveness no matter what the social and political
context? In other words, do medical research methods themselves
tend to inflate effectiveness predictions?
Lastly, Alex Broadbent (2015) reports on and critiques a meth-
odological movement (he says “revolution”) in contemporary
epidemiology, which he calls the Potential Outcomes Approach
(POA). The elements of this movement are not new, but the social
dynamics around it are such that it challenges the established
epidemiological paradigm of causal inference. That paradigm,
exemplified by the history of smoking and lung cancer, emphasises
the use of multiple evidentiary sources collated in a qualitative
judgement. The POA instead focuses on a set of formal methods,
thus switching the focus to single studies, and insists that causal
questions be framed as explicitly as possible in reference to contrast
classes. Broadbent identifies four conceptual commitments that he
argues underpin the POA, and argues against them. One of these
theses is the implicit commitment that causal knowledge entails
(suffices for) predictive ability. Broadbent argues that prediction is
typically a separate step from causal inference. The most obvious
critique of Broadbent’s paper is a charge of straw man, a charge he
is at pains to rebut, but which may persist nonetheless. How much
‘rational reconstruction’ of the various writings and sayings of
various epidemiologists is permissible, and how does one go about
assessing whether these writings and sayings amount to a univocal
movement? Does anyone adhere, whether knowingly or unwit-
tingly, to the tenets of the POA as Broadbent identifies them? Since
the chief proponents of the POA have not formulated it as an
explicit position, these are difficult questions to answer fairly.
Together, these papers form an interesting picture of prediction
in epidemiology and medicine. In physics, prediction is often por-
trayed as the tumbling out of a hypothesis from a theory. In com-
parison, prediction in epidemiology and medicine looks muchPlease cite this article in press as: Fuller, J., et al., Prediction in epidemiolo
Biomedical Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.07.001more like a complicated assembly line that starts with crude data
from some individuals and winds up with a refined claim about
what will happen to other individuals (collectively or individually).
The assembly line is perhaps longer than we appreciate; along the
way choices are made about what to measure, how to conceptu-
alize ‘causation’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘prediction’, and how to infer
causal claims, effectiveness claims and prediction claims. Quality
checks at various points along the line reveal deep philosophical
problems with the way we understand causation and intervention,
with the way we measure effectiveness and with the way we
extrapolate and probabilize study results.
Theory- or model-construction and explanation are the main
goals in sciences like physics, biology and psychology. Theorizing
and explaining are often not the primary objects in epidemiology or
medicine. In order to understand epidemiologic and medical
practice, philosophers must adjust their focus to new topics and
new questions. ‘Prediction’ is a term broad enough to encompass
many activities and problems in philosophy of epidemiology and
philosophy of medicine, from extrapolation to effectiveness and
mechanistic reasoning. These problems are each held togeth-
erdand as a group hang togetherdin general ways, which makes
them ideal candidates for themost general analysis; in other words,
for philosophical study.Acknowledgements
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